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 In “Terror: A Speech After 9-11,” Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak highlights the multiple 
ethical and political risks she must take in order to critique the West’s response to Al Qaeda’s 
September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States.  Spivak is aware that in questioning the 
dominant discourses surrounding the war in Afghanistan and on global terrorism, she places 
herself in a precarious position.  As we shall see, she is wary of adopting the mantle of 
agency upon which to rest a response in the face of the war on terrorism, which she describes 
as a “cruel caricature of what in us can respond” (Spivak, “Terror” 81).   
On the one hand, to question the logic of that war is to risk being interpreted as 
defending the actions of those who perpetrate terrorism.  On the other hand, challenging the 
prevailing understandings and representations of terrorist violence risks regurgitating the 
same practices that inform those very discourses, as one moves perilously close to providing 
an explanation of the terrorist’s actions in terms that stem from one’s own interpretation of 
those actions and not from the terrorists themselves.  To explain the terrorist’s actions in 
one’s own words risks interpreting their intentions through the filter of one’s own cultural, 
political, or social assumptions.  Thus, we are in danger of reading the terrorist’s actions in 
terms of cultural stereotypes of race, gender, religion, class, and so on.  Last, but not least, 
                                                          
1 Originally published in of Journal of Postcolonial Cultures and Societies, Special Issue on ‘Women 
and Terrorism’ May 2013,  
https://writingbeyondthemargins.org/journal-of-postcolonial-culture-and-societies/2013-3/2013-2/ . 
Publication now no longer available) 
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Spivak realises that she is taking on a perilous task in arguing that it is necessary to 
interrogate the logic that allows for the condemnation of terrorist action, especially in the 
political climate created in the wake of the September 11, 2001, terror attacks against the 
United States.  The strength of feeling about terrorism after the attacks was such that Spivak 
recounts witnessing a debate at an American university where students put their “hands up in 
that Law auditorium condoning murder, albeit carried out by the state” (Spivak, “Terror” 
101).  Spivak’s decision to mobilise her agency as an academic to try to formulate a means of 
responding to the seemingly unanswerable is thus rife with ethical and political danger. 
 Yet Spivak puts it to us that it is precisely because of these dangers that we, 
particularly in the West, must interrupt the rhetorical circuit that sustains the war on terrorism 
and terrorism discourses more broadly.  In essence, this circuit works on the assumption that 
the only response to terrorism consists of a “counter–terrorism” course of action—a binary 
understanding of what constitutes a response that will ensure that terrorist violence is met 
with state-sanctioned violence. For Spivak, there is no hope of escaping the cycle of terror–
counterterror without the recognition that a “response not only supposes and produces a 
constructed subject of response, it also constructs its object” (Spivak 82).  The logic of 
terror–counterterror , then, serves to constitute and reify stereotypes of both the terrorized 
subject and the terrorist object to produce a self-sustaining loop that offers little alternative to 
perpetual violence.  
Whilst Spivak’s observation may not be unfamiliar, what is significant is the 
symbiotic relationship between terror and counter–terror—by which I mean that terrorism’s 
demand for a response serves to shape the respondent, just as the response serves to construct 
the terrorist object.   Taking the September 11th attacks as a specific example, if Al Qaeda 
chose to read the myriad lives of the individuals who worked in the World Trade Center, the 
Pentagon, and who happened to be on board planes they hijacked for the attacks as 
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representative of America’s “military and economic power” (Osama bin Laden, quoted in 
Mir), then the Bush administration implicitly accepted that claim in forming their response to 
Al Qaeda.  When George W. Bush launched the War on Terror at a news conference by 
declaring, “You’re either with us or against us in the fight against terror” (6th November, 
2001), he, too, assumed that a multitude of different lives could be taken as representing an 
“us,” a homogenised mass united in the desire to respond to a terrorist “them.”  It is this 
symbiotic relationship—in which a violent demand of the terrorist object has the means of 
constructing the terrorized subject through that subject’s apparent agency—that I wish to 
return to later.  For now, it is important to understand the methodology that Spivak proposes 
for breaking through and into this self-supporting circuit.  
 Much in the same way that Spivak demonstrated the double silencing of subaltern 
women in socio-political discourses around sati during and after British colonial rule of India, 
Spivak argues that if what constitutes a response to terror, to war, to violence, is understood 
purely within the political, legal, or military terms already available to us, then there is no 
avenue for genuine change.  She observes: “Unless we are trained into imaging the other, a 
necessary, impossible, and interminable task, nothing we do through politico-legal 
calculation will last, even with the chanciness of the future anterior: something will have 
been when we plan a something will be” (Spivak, “Terror” 83). Interestingly, here Spivak 
makes a deliberate decision to use the term “other” as opposed to its more widespread, 
capitalised version, “Other.”   For Spivak, the “Other” represents a pre-established conceptual 
space that is constructed by the subject in order to accommodate the other as Other.  In such a 
space, the other is always anticipated and is, thus, always already framed in terms appropriate 
to the subject.  The term “other,” in contrast, does not claim the status of a pre-established 
concept and, hence, does not merit capitalisation.  As such, the other remains irreducibly 
other, outside any existing framework of interpretation.  In short, the Other refers to the 
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object constructed by an epistemology, while the other is a gesture towards the unknowable 
other that cannot be reduced to fit within the subject’s terms. 
To formulate one’s response within an established framework is thus not to respond at 
all, because if the subject uses existing frameworks to interpret the other’s actions, it in fact 
constructs and responds to an Other rather than interacting with that other. Be it at the level of 
individual reaction or international response, if the other’s actions are inserted into pre-
existing epistemological frameworks, there can be no response.  Instead, there is only a futile 
attempt to overwrite the presence of an other’s demand with one’s own terms—terms 
provided and dictated by pre-established models for understanding the world.  It is only in 
recognising the presence of an other that is irreducible to one’s own terms, and impossible to 
quantify and qualify within one’s own framework that the possibility of a response emerges.  
Spivak suggests we need to train our imaginations to allow for the possibility of the other, as 
a form of “preparation for the eruption of the ethical” (Spivak, "Terror" 83).  It is Spivak’s 
definition of the ethical that provides us with a model with which to appraise the 
subject/object relationship set up in terrorism discourses.  Spivak tells us: 
I understand the ethical [. . .] to be an interruption of the epistemological, which is the 
attempt to construct the other as object of knowledge.  Epistemological constructions 
belong to the domain of the law, which seeks to know the other, in his or her case, as 
completely as possible, in order to punish or acquit rationally, reason being defined by 
the limits set by the law itself.  The ethical interrupts this imperfectly, to listen to the 
other as if it were a self, neither to punish nor to acquit (“Terror” 83). 
 
It is important to stress here that Spivak is not suggesting that we abandon legal and political 
forms of response, but rather than we recognise that when we rely on these pre-established 
modes of response, we are in fact substituting judgement for response.  Response requires the 
suspension of the epistemological criteria through which the subject—the presumed master of 
the epistemology—claims access to the other so that the other can be heard.  Without this 
suspension, the subject can never address or respond to an other, but will always instead 
address the Other constructed by the subject’s own epistemological approach.  For Spivak, 
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“to respond means to resonate with the other,” to let the other’s voice reverberate within 
ourselves and in doing so, “contemplate the possibility of complicity” (“Terror” 87).  This 
ability to hear the other, to resonate with the other, pre-figures change (Spivak, “Terror” 87).  
Change is set in motion by recognising the possibility of complicity with the other and 
understanding the limits of one’s own epistemological constructs or figurations of the world. 
 The ethical task that Spivak sets for herself and for the world as a whole is thus a 
hazardous one in such a volatile political climate.  She argues that the ethical always begins 
with a suspension or interruption of epistemological systems  in order to allow the other to be 
heard in its own terms.  To drive home how radical this ethical demand is, let us be plain: 
Spivak is asking that the countries such as Spain, the U.K., and the U.S.A. , put aside their 
prevailing narratives of the War on Terror to allow those who have attacked cities in each of 
these nations to be heard in their own terms.   In Spivak’s critique of the post-September 11th 
climate, this means specifically putting aside Western stereotypes of what constitutes Islam—
or more significantly, Islamic fundamentalism—in favour of listening to how the Islamic 
world represents itself and engages with extremist elements in its own space and on its own 
terms.   Such a suspension of stereotypes and epistemological constructions of the other 
involves “the attempt to figure the other as imaginative actant” (Spivak, "Terror" 94) 
possessing a logic, rationale, or motivation that cannot simply be explained in terms that are 
not their own.  Without such a radical move, Spivak posits that the violent cycle of terrorist 
attack followed by aggressive state or international action is destined to continue across the 
globe, be it in the form of a U.S-led battle against Al Qaeda, the intractable circuit of 
Palestinian attack followed by Israeli military reaction, or in specific, localised clashes 
between insurgents and states. Spivak’s demand is subtle thinking for unsubtle times, and she 
herself acknowledges that her own attempts to adopt this ethical stance in relation to suicide 
bombing has “provoked so much hostility” that she has to couch her comments within a pre-
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emptive explanation (Spivak, “Terror” 93).  Perhaps unsurprisingly then, we find Spivak’s 
analysis peppered with clarifications about what she is not stating, alongside her positive 
assertions.  This serves as a necessary paradigm for attempts to take up Spivak’s stance and 
to prevent misreadings that shut down the ethical spaces opened up by such interventions.  
 As such, it is necessary to make it clear that this paper interrogates the 
epistemological framework through which the West understands women’s participation in 
terrorist activity.  In doing so, I adopt Spivak’s methodology to expose the ways in which the 
agency of women who engage in terrorism is disavowed by the substitution of the 
epistemologically-constructed female terrorist for the flesh-and-blood violent woman in the 
West’s dominant narratives of terrorism, a substitution which carries particular consequences 
when the object under scrutiny is classified as a “non-Western” woman.  Moreover, I ask 
what mechanisms install this epistemological framework in the first instance and then 
examine the kinds of normative subjectivities both presumed and produced by the current 
framework prevalent in Western terrorism discourses.  
My intention is not, however, to try and speak for the women represented in the 
studies and discourses I critique.  To offer alternative explanations for their actions can, to a 
certain degree, open up debates about women and violence, but it nonetheless leaves the 
women in question as voiceless as the narratives one tries to disrupt, as such explanations 
potentially overwrite what the women themselves have stated about their actions.  My focus 
is thus on the representation of women’s violence.  This is not meant as a critique that 
“privilege[s] “our” representations of terrorism in order to reveal how global politics is 
constructed “at the expense of the subaltern, a risk Katherine E. Brown identifies as inherent 
in such critiques (205).  Instead, I want to unearth what is at stake for women across the 
world if such representations are not interrogated and located as arising from a specific socio-
cultural context.  In doing so, the work of Luce Irigaray becomes vital in both understanding 
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this context, and in articulating the connection between privileged and subaltern women in 
such a way as to avoid overwriting the differences between women and falling back on 
universal concepts of femininity and womanhood. 
 
An Epistemology of Female Violence 
 There is no clear consensus about what constitutes terrorism throughout the multitude 
of studies and histories that make up the canon of terrorism studies.  Schmid and Jongman 
famously demonstrated this when they uncovered at least 109 working definitions about what 
constitutes terrorism in the late 1980s and have discovered even more since (Schmid and 
Jongman). Interpretations of what counts as terrorism are varied and permeated with subtle, 
but significant, differences.   Early attempts by authors such as W.A. Tupman and Walter 
Laqueur tried to develop a taxonomy that differentiated terrorist activity from guerrilla 
warfare (Tupman; Laqueur), while later studies focus on the differences between state and 
insurgent violence (for example, E. S. Herman and O’Sullivan; Wilkinson).  A large section 
of terrorism research adopts Jonathan R. White’s approach, which accepts that “we do not 
know how to define terrorism, but we know what it is when we see it” (4).  This flexibility 
persists at state and international levels: branches of state power operate with different 
definitions of terrorism, and international and regional institutions—such as the United 
Nations and the European Union—are unable to produce legislation that outlines once and for 
all a standard for what constitutes terrorism (Schmid and Jongman; Silke).  Thus, while 
institutions like the United Nations are increasingly attempting to define terrorism as violence 
that specifically targets civilians or “non-combatants,” a universal definition remains elusive 
within terrorism studies and discourses. 
There is, nonetheless, an established epistemological toolkit with which experts may 
discern terrorist behaviour.  This toolkit can be roughly divided into examinations of the 
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mechanisms of terrorism—the means adopted to perpetrate violence—and the processes that 
bring about a terroristic turn.  These processes are understood as falling into a set of specific 
motivational categories: religious, ideological, or political motivations; some form of social, 
economic, or cultural disenfranchisement; or the psychological make-up of a group or 
individual.  Thus, with vastly varying degrees of rigour and academic legitimacy, terrorism 
studies include psychological, sociological, anthropological, and economic approaches in its 
epistemic arsenal.2  
 Nowhere in the array of definitions used to underpin terrorism research is it ever 
explicitly stated that terrorism is a specifically male form of violence.  Yet although it is 
never openly stated that terrorist violence is inherently male, the fact that there is a subset of 
research dedicated specifically to women’s involvement with terrorism exposes the extent to 
which Western culture assumes violence in general is a masculine activity.  This is despite 
the fact that histories of terrorist violence and contemporary studies of terrorist organisations 
demonstrate that women have consistently been inextricably involved in such violence, as 
they take on any role in an organisation from supporters to carrying out attacks (see for 
example Victor; Bloom).  Given the absence of any claim that the sex of the perpetrator has a 
pivotal role in identifying whether an act is terrorist or not, we have to wonder about the 
origins of this specific subcategory of research.  Why is it that women merit special attention 
in terrorism studies?  What are the consequences of treating women’s violent actions as 
somehow exceptional or simply different within the spectrum of terrorist violence?   And 
how does this gender-specific epistemological approach to violence impact wider 
understandings of women’s agency, particularly in the political sphere? 
                                                          
2 For a sense of the variance in the application of these frameworks across terrorism discourses, it is worth 
comparing something like Andrew Sinclair’s Anatomy of Terror with any work by Andrew Silke. 
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 To address these questions, I will sketch out the epistemological framework used for 
reading women’s terrorist actions by closely analysing recent investigations of women 
suicide bombers.   In doing so, I illustrate how the language used to interpret women’s 
violence not only disavows the woman perpetrator’s capacity for action, but also forestalls 
attempts to critique such a disavowal.  I go on to argue that Luce Irigaray’s work on the 
relationship between the body, language, and sexual (or as she calls it, “sexuate”) identity, 
can elucidate why a culture would produce a special epistemological approach to explain 
suicide bombings executed by women.  In doing so, I hope to shed new light on why the 
figure of the woman suicide bomber holds such a morbid fascination for sections of the 
media, and why she is a singularly troubling figure for the dominant Western voices in the 
global political sphere. 
  
Women Suicide Bombers 
 In 2005 one of the leading journals in terrorism studies, Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism, dedicated a special issue to exploring women’s terrorist and militant actions.  In 
her introduction to this special edition, Cindy Ness expressed the hope that the collection 
would help terrorism discourses in general to “move beyond the portrayal of the female 
militant/terrorist as either passive victim or feminist warrior” (“Introduction”350).  Ness’s 
opening remarks neatly sum up the prevailing stereotypes of women’s violence both within 
terrorism studies and beyond.  Her optimism about the potential impact of the work presented 
in that issue casts a poignant light on the articles that followed in later editions, particularly as 
the articles published alongside her “Introduction” worked both to disrupt and confirm the 
very stereotypes she critiques.  Contributions such as Carolyn Nordstrom’s “(Gendered) 
War” and Brigitte Nacos’ “The Portrayal of Female Terrorists in the Media” worked to 
undermine stereotypes of women’s passivity or militant feminism, while papers by Kathleen 
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Blee, Anne Nivat, and Susan McKay highlighted the significant roles women and girls play 
in militant organisations (Nordstrom; Nacos; Blee; Nivat; McKay).  However, in in “Women 
Fighting in Jihad?” David Cook repeatedly characterises women involved with militant 
Islamic organisations as simply being the passive victims of an exploitative patriarchal 
culture, working against the attempts to open up the understanding of women’s terrorism that 
Ness envisions (Cook).  Indeed, one would hesitate over how effective an intervention a 
dedicated journal issue could be, given that in a publication devoted to the scrutiny of 
different forms of violence and conflict, women’s violence is accorded an exceptional status, 
ring-fenced in a special issue.  
A more recent article by Karen Jacques and Paul Taylor published in the same journal 
in 2008 helps to gauge how far Ness’s hopes have been fulfilled since the 2005 issue (Jacques 
and Taylor).  The title of Jacques’ and Taylor’s article, “Male and Female Suicide Bombers: 
Different Sexes, Different Reasons?,” stands out from much of the literature on terrorism.  If 
studies like Cook’s “Women Fighting in Jihad?” (2005), Margaret Gonzalez-Perez’s Women 
and Terrorism: Female Activity in Domestic and International Terror Groups (2008), and 
Luisella de Cataldo Neuburger’s and Tiziana Valentini’s Women and Terrorism (1996) make 
it clear that women are the main focus of their investigations, in contrast it is rare that a study 
states that it is specifically looking at “men” and terrorism or “male” militancy.  Rarer still 
are texts that set out to place the two sexes alongside one another for comparative purposes.  
The title of Jacques and Taylor’s investigation suggests that they will do just that: see if 
differences in motivation to engage in acts of terror can legitimately be mapped onto different 
sexual identities.  Yet despite their intentions, Jacques and Taylor ultimately only provide an 
account of “the motivations and recruitment of female terrorists” (Jacques and Taylor 304).  
It is this contrast between the intention expressed in the article’s title and what the study 
actually does that makes Jacques’ and Taylor’s piece so illuminating.  It lays bare how the a 
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priori assumptions embedded in the epistemology of terrorism both determine the authors’ 
interpretations and conclusions, and also shape their study in ways that run counter to their 
stated research aspirations.  From the outset of their article, then, Jacques and Taylor suggest 
that women’s involvement in terrorism is the exceptional behaviour that requires explanation,  
a presumption that simultaneously assumes men’s involvement with violence is a given, as 
explored later. 
Before looking at Jacques’ and Taylor’s study in detail, it is important to note that 
they are not alone in according male terrorism a normative status that subsequently suggests 
that female violence is “unique,” exceptional, or problematic.  In her critical analysis of work 
on Muslim women’s suicide terrorism, Brown notes that “men’s participation in political 
violence is assumed and taken for granted whereas women’s needs proof and explanation” 
(Brown 203).  In their discussion of the impact that Al Qaeda’s attacks on the U.S. on 
September 11, 2001, have had on international legal and political frameworks, H. 
Charlesworth and C. Chinkin argue that “sex remains unexceptional and unmarked if it is the 
male sex” (602) that has perpetrated the violence, as male violence is understood as the norm.  
They posit that we would only have considered the sex of the attackers relevant if they had 
been women.  Locating their discussions of women and terrorism in wider trends within 
legislative and sociological spheres, academic experts such as Ian Ward and Luisella de 
Cataldo Neuburger demonstrate that legal systems all over the world interpret women’s 
violence or criminal behaviour “as a deviation from dominant male norms; female criminality 
is therefore defined by sociologists as a subculture” (De Cataldo Neuburger and Valentini  
40; see also Ward 23, 95-122). Thus, in societies that take the masculine subject to be the 
norm—as is the case in patriarchal cultures across the globe—women’s violence is always 
posited as deviant in relation to the standard, and therefore “normal,” forms of violence 
executed by men.  In effect, any and all women who resort to criminality or violence are 
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interpreted as exhibiting even greater deviancy than criminal or violent men, meaning that 
society searches for alternative explanations to account for the apparently excessive nature of 
women’s violence. 
Jacques’ and Taylor’s study demonstrates specifically how alternative explanations 
for women’s deviant behaviour are constructed—in this case with terrorist violence providing 
an extreme example of women’s turn to violence.   At the beginning of their study, Jacques 
and Taylor cite the 2005 edition of Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, dedicated to women 
and terrorism, as a way of framing the goals of their research.  According to them: 
What this special [2005] issue did not consider in detail, and where there is arguably 
less understanding of female involvement, is the personal level.  How are females 
persuaded or recruited into extremism?  What motivates them into carrying out an act 
of suicide terrorism? (305). 
 
This citation makes explicit that from the outset of their research, Jacques and Taylor are 
grounding their interpretation of women’s violence in culturally-established assumptions 
about women.  For example, women are always “persuaded or recruited,” which presumes 
that women never seek out terror organisations of their own accord, which in turn excludes 
the possibility that women may choose—even in the most limited sense—to become 
terrorists.  Similarly, it is plain from this quote that Jacques and Taylor see a direct link 
between women’s motivation to engage in violence and their “personal” lives—a link that is 
in-keeping with conventional readings of women, as I discuss subsequently.  Finally, even 
their use of the prepositional phrase “into carrying out” connotes that women engaged in acts 
of terrorism must be considered as passive participants in contrast to the more active 
participation assumed of male terrorists, who simply “carry out” attacks.  Taken together, 
these elements of the statement of intent that begins Jacques and Taylor’s research suggest 
they automatically assume that women terrorists will conform to cultural stereotypes of 
femininity in that they will be passive participants, entirely influenced by their emotions or 
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by the men around them.  Embedded in the questions that ground their research, then, are 
expectations based on common patriarchal stereotypes of feminine passivity, vulnerability, 
and emotional impetus.  
Jacques and Taylor also reinforce the cultural assumption that men always provide 
society with the “normal” model of subjectivity by following the established convention in 
terrorism studies of taking the male terrorist as the yardstick against which women’s violence 
should be compared.  Jacques and Taylor make this assumption explicit as they outline the 
methodology for their study:  
[. . .] by comparing the female cases to data on the motivations of male suicide 
terrorists, it is possible to begin to build up a picture of the unique personal 
motivations of female suicide terrorists (306).  
 
In laying out the individual hypotheses that shape their study, Jacques and Taylor frame each 
by speculating about how female violence will compare to male violence.  This is evidenced 
in statements they make such as: “Compared to males, females will less often be associated 
with religious/nationalistic motivations for carrying our suicide terrorism ” (306); and 
“Compared to males, females will be more frequently associated with Personal motivations 
for carrying out suicide terrorism”(308).  Although elsewhere, Jacques and Taylor state that 
“males and females are equally capable of aggressive behaviour [. . .]  they show no 
difference in their aggressive behaviour following a frustrating event,”(307) it is clear from 
the questions that ground their research and the structure of their hypotheses that the authors 
are working within a narrow epistemological framework that presumes violence is a 
masculine trait.  
For Jacques and Taylor, then, comparing women’s terrorist violence to a male 
standard reveals what is relatively different and specific about women’s violence.  Rather 
than treating women’s suicide terrorism as a phenomenon in its own right, this study suggests 
that understanding this kind of violence is simply a matter of describing how it differs from 
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male suicide terrorism.  Moreover, for Jacques and Taylor, such a comparison reveals that 
women’s actions are associated with “personal” motivations from the study’s opening 
paragraph, while male motivations remain uninflected by any such qualification and are 
instead seen as political action.  This is particularly important, as terrorism is widely 
differentiated from other forms of violent behaviour precisely because it is seen as having 
political, rather than personal, motivations.  When women engage in terrorism, they are 
potentially becoming political agents and therefore are transgressing traditional feminine 
norms established by patriarchy that claim “women are apolitical [and] that women’s primary 
purpose and function is to be a mother and a wife rather than having an individual identity of 
her own” (S. N. Herman 261–2).  Thus, for a woman to become a terrorist, something truly 
extraordinary must have occurred, and for Jacques and Taylor, this occurrence is best 
understood as a “personal” experience. 
Jacques’ and Taylor’s observations thus re-inscribe pre-established patriarchal norms 
about women in their own hypotheses.  Although Jacques and Taylor do not generate this 
framework with its a priori assumptions about gender and violence, their work is interesting 
precisely because it imports the explanations offered up by existing material on (male) 
suicide bombing to create an interpretative lens for female terrorism.  In doing so, they 
inadvertently unveil the gender bias in the seemingly neutral terminology that permeates 
terrorism studies.  Descriptions such as “terrorist,”  “individual,” “extremist group,” and 
“identity” are not, in fact, as gender-neutral as they first appear. By bringing prior studies of 
apparently sexless individual’s motivations into contact with questions of sex and gender, 
Jacques and Taylor accidently expose how frequently their predecessors have presumed these 
terms must refer either to men or masculinity.  In positing that the weight of motivating 
factors “may not be equal for men and women” (306), Jacques and Taylor reveal the lack of 
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attention paid to sexual identity in previous work, and thus apparently render existing 
explanations for suicide violence problematic or incomplete.  
Once women terrorists are taken into account, it is no longer viable to make generic 
statements about the reasons behind terrorist violence.  One can no longer simply state that a 
“possible motivation for suicide terrorism arises out of an individual’s psychological 
response to events and circumstances that were beyond their control” (Jacques and Taylor 
306). This is because such a hypothesis does not take into account that an “equally important 
cited reason for female engagement is exploitation, whereby an organization or individual 
takes advantage of an individual’s specific circumstances to recruit a suicide bomber” 
(Jacques and Taylor 306).  Once sex and gender enter the epistemological framework of 
terrorism, the generic individual needs to be gendered so that exceptional nature of female 
terrorism can be dealt with.  In other words, when women remain outside the scope of a 
study, there is no need to mark out the sex of the perpetrators.  However,  the moment women 
enter the narrative, sex and gender become key to understanding their aberrantly violent 
behaviour. 
The intention here is not to argue that it is invalid to examine whether or not men and 
women turn to violence for different reasons.   Given that men and women occupy different 
positions in socio-cultural matrices, this seems a plausible hypothesis.  Rather, I argue it is 
critical to understand precisely the lack of recognition of such a difference.  By allowing the 
male terrorist to remain an ideal gender-neutral yardstick against which to gauge female 
terrorism, Jacques and Taylor repeat the trend that V.G. Julie Rajan has found across all 
representations of female suicide bombers: “women bombers, by and large, are represented in 
ways that highlight them first and foremost as women, in line with common social ideologies 
about women” (Rajan 2).  Be it in the media, terrorist propaganda, or in political and 
academic discourses about terrorism, to talk about women suicide bombers is to talk about 
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female behaviour in accordance with patriarchal ideologies of femininity.  The apparent 
necessity for taking sex into account to explain female actions goes beyond discussions of the 
suicide bomber.  De Cataldo Neuburger explored this in her examination of sociological and 
criminological studies: 
Women [. . .] are determined by their biology.  Their hormones, their reproductive 
role, necessarily determine their emotionality, childishness, deviousness, etc.  These 
traits, in turn, characterise female crime.  If crime can be explained in biological 
terms, any adequate explanation has to explain why female, but not male, biology 
determines deviant behaviour. (De Cataldo Neuburger and Valentini 33) 
 
As the terms “male” and “female” are only used in terrorism studies when the author is trying 
to understand women’s terrorist actions, the biological slant in interpreting women’s violent 
behaviour manifests itself once women enter the discussion.  These terms describe the sexual 
characteristics of a subject or object, as opposed to the more complex, nuanced and 
specifically human terms, “women” and “men.”  In the context of explaining human action, 
“male” and “female” carry with them connotations of “natural,” instinctual or animalistic 
behaviour.   Joseba Zulaika and William A. Douglass have written a compelling analysis of 
how terrorists are accorded an animal-like status (149-190).  It is, therefore, no surprise that 
the epistemology of terrorism adopts the more biological lexicon to describe sexual 
difference.  It is telling, however, that it is only when the presence of the female body 
complicates the assumption of a male norm that the terms become relevant.  Again, we see 
here a continuation of cultural stereotypes of femininity, as women have long been portrayed 
as occupying a space closer to the “animal”—meaning their identities are presumed to be 
determined by biological influences thanks to their animalistic bodies.  This is a point we 
shall return to as we examine what is meant by “personal motivations.” 
 Jacques and Taylor do reject out-of-hand some of the claims their predecessors have 
made about female terrorism, despite working within an epistemology that identifies the 
female as the exceptional.  For example, Matthew Dearing suggests that “[p]sychological 
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responses to traumatic events, such as rape or death in the family, can have a powerful impact 
on a woman’s choice to end her life“ by reluctantly being recruited for a suicide mission 
(1082).  Jacques and Taylor challenge the evidence that such trauma is a distinctly female 
experience by arguing that  “when men and women endure the same living conditions [. . .] it 
is reasonable to assume that they suffer the loss of a loved one to a similar extent,” and that 
“both sexes are open to exploitation” (307).  Furthermore, they concur with prior research 
that found that “a desire for revenge is unrelated to gender” (307). They also resist the 
conventional wisdom that women’s involvement in terrorism is inherently connected to a 
demand for sexual equality by arguing that “the present data showed no instances of this 
occurring as a motivation and it is therefore not explored as a motivational category” (308). 
Thus, Jacques and Taylor are conscious of the limitations gendered stereotypes have placed 
on other work and make efforts to counteract such inherent bias.  The selection of their data 
set, made up of information found on 30 female and 30 male suicide attackers—involved in 
groups concerned with the Palestinian–Israeli conflict; Al Qaeda and its many offshoots; 
Pakistan and Kurdistan separatism; and the Sri Lankan Tamil Tigers (LTTE)—reveals how 
they strive for a more balanced comparison and attempt to compensate for the fact that the 
majority of data available concerns male terrorists (Jacques and Taylor 311).  
 Yet the categories Jacques and Taylor use to analyse what motivates women terrorists 
work against their efforts to mitigate the impact of gender stereotyping  by reinstalling 
Western ideas of femininity into the study.  The authors set up four categories to describe an 
individual’s motivation toward terrorism: “Religious/Nationalistic Reasons”; responses to 
“Key Events”;  “Revenge” motivations;  and “Personal” motivations.  The distinctions among 
these categories are hazy at best.  For example, joining a religious or nationalistic extremist 
group is understood as providing an individual with a means for “realizing [. . .] social and 
personal identities“  and “a means of acting on anger directed toward the authorities” 
Liz Sage Page 18 of 37 
 
(Jacques and Taylor 306).  While such descriptions clearly overlap with “Personal” and 
“Revenge” categories, Jacques and Taylor nevertheless define membership of such a group as 
corresponding purely to the “Religious/Nationalistic Reasons” category.  Similarly, an 
“individual’s psychological response to events and circumstances that were beyond their 
control,” such as the death of a loved one, is listed as a “Key Event” response.  But  “ 
Revenge,” also brought about by the death of a loved one, “emerges from personal factors,” 
and yet is somehow distinct from” Key Events” and “Personal” motivation (Jacques and 
Taylor 306-307).  
Given that anger, revenge, psychological trauma, and identity form central aspects of 
these categories, what then constitutes a “Personal” motivation?  According to Jacques and 
Taylor, the personal involves low self-esteem, depression, isolation from society, shame and 
dishonour, and monetary problems (Jacques and Taylor 308).  These are all arguably 
elements that are consequences of or feed into the other motivational categories, so why have 
they been singled out as a separate category? Jacques and Taylor argue:  
Previous studies have emphasized that females tend to hold more personal 
motivations than males [. . .].  Even women whose motivation for participation 
includes an ideological element are often found to hold dualistic personal and 
ideological motivations, rather than pure religious or nationalistic motives.  Male 
motivations are more likely to be found in group membership [. . .] previous 
involvement in the conflict [. . .] and/or religious involvement [. . .] than personal 
involvement. (Jacques and Taylor 308) 
 
The personal, then, is a category designed to encompass the anomalous mixture of 
ideological and personal elements that make up female motivation in particular, compared to 
the purely ideological motivations of men.  The specifically feminine quality of the 
“Personal” category is driven home by the fact that it is under this heading that the authors 
have chosen to address and dismiss feminism and gender equality as motivating factors.  
Rather than recognising that feminism and gender equality are in fact political movements, 
Jacques and Taylor categorise them as “personal” factors. These movements, it seems, are not 
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political interventions but personal agendas that are separate and distinct from the political or 
ideological sphere in which they surface.  Given this overt gendering of the personal and the 
need to categorise it as somehow separate from the political and ideological, Jacques and 
Taylor’s ensuing hypothesis that “[c]ompared to males, females will be more frequently 
associated with Personal motivations for carrying out suicide terrorism” (308) seeks to 
separate women’s motivations for terrorism from the political context in which they act and 
thereby undermines any sense that these women are political or ideological actors. 
 Jacques’ and Taylor’s inclusion of the personal as an analytical category indicates 
their attempt to account for women’s violence within an epistemological framework that 
takes the masculine subject as the norm.  Such an elastic category allows the presumed 
anomaly of women’s involvement in terrorist violence to be absorbed into terrorism 
discourses without disrupting the underlying presumptions about normative subjectivity, as it 
implies these actions are the result of a specifically feminine form of deviance.  Central to 
this elasticity are particular understandings of the relationship between language and identity, 
as well as between language and referent.  As Jacques’ and Taylor’s methodology is to 
analyse linguistic sources to assess the accuracy of their hypotheses, we can excavate these 
understandings from their analysis and ensuing conclusions.  The study’s data set was based 
on “biographical accounts” reported to be from would-be suicide bombers, found in “books, 
journals, newspaper articles and information retrieved from the Internet,” and written or 
translated into the English language.  According to Jacques and Taylor: “For each individual, 
the kinds of information typically available were personal accounts, accounts provided by 
friends, family and the media, evidence gleaned from wills and testaments, and videos left by 
the individual prior to their attack” (310–311).  In describing their data set Jacques and 
Taylor are sensitive to the fact this kind of evidence will contain bias, noting, as Rosemary 
Skaine does elsewhere, that the connection between gender and terrorism seems to be a 
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singularly Western preoccupation (10).  Jacques and Taylor recognise that “the Western 
media tends to focus more on personal aspects of female suicide terrorists with actions 
minimised and credibility and influence diminished” and further argue that the inclusion of 
the “Arab press” will serve as a counterbalance to this bias, as it is generally “freer of gender 
stereotypes and downplays the personal aspects of female terrorists” (311).  This is a curious 
balancing act, for it recognises the potential for reductive stereotyping in Western 
representations of female violence, but does not extend this recognition to encompass the idea 
that “Arab” representations will come with their attendant set of stereotypes.  Indeed, Rajan’s 
in-depth analysis of the way in which terrorist groups represent women suicide bombers 
exposes how such groups make women’s actions fit culturally acceptable notions of 
femininity by portraying them as virginal martyrs or mothers-of-the-nation (Rajan, see in 
particular chapters 4 and 5).  As such, Rajan’s work illustrates the flawed nature of Jacques 
and Taylor’s assumption that Western stereotypes will be cancelled out by the inclusion of 
the portrayal of women in “other” cultures. 
Similarly, relying on secondary sources that present culturally-biased representations 
of women suicide-bombers-to-be rather than what the women themselves have stated about 
their own violence means this data will inevitably embed the ways in which the people and 
culture around the bomber use gender and sexual identity to explain the women’s individual’s 
behaviour in the study’s results—regardless of the precautions and analytical strategies the 
authors’ adopt. Finally, nowhere is there an acknowledgement that stereotypes and concepts 
of masculinity shape the representations of male suicide bombing—an omission that installs 
the male subject as the norm once again in this comparative study. 
 Most significantly, the entire study is premised on the notion that words can be taken 
at face value, and that language is equivalent to its referent.   Whilst Jacques and Taylor are 
careful to cross-check information and subject their data set to a rigorous linguistic analyses, 
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they do not extend their insight that Western and Arabic cultures use language differently to a 
wider recognition that the same can apply to individual subjects.  The possibility that when 
different subjects explain their actions in terms of their nationalist feeling or family history, 
they could in some way be describing the same motivation escapes the mechanism of this 
study.  For example, Ness’s work indicates that women are more frequently involved in 
ethno-separatist terrorism than in religious extremist action (“In the Name”).  In Jacques and 
Taylor’s epistemic approach, we would need to decide where we draw the linguistic line 
between talking about one’s ethnicity and one’s family, which will inevitably be an arbitrary 
and value-laden distinction.  In order to conduct their study, Jacques and Taylor would have 
had to strip language of any ambiguity and assume that what a given source says equates 
precisely to what they mean.  In doing so, they also presume all subjects have an equal, 
universal access to language that would allow any deviation or difference in the language 
used to be read as indicative of an intentional production of meaning.  No allowance is made 
for any form of difference and the impact these differences have on a subject’s access to and 
use of language.  There is no recognition that different subjects are located in a specific set of 
relations to existing systems of representation and thus use those systems from their 
particular context.  To put it another way, when men talk about nationalist, religious, and 
ideological motivations, who is to say that they are not also talking about their families, their 
children, their domestic life?  And if and when women use the language of personal 
experience to elaborate on their actions, why is this necessarily apolitical?  These questions 
become all the more important when we consider the fact that terrorism discourses are 
increasingly shaping much of global politics.  Given this, it becomes crucial that we ask what 
notions of men and women, masculine and feminine, are being covertly installed within our 
national and international frameworks under the guise of counter-terrorist policy based on 
representations of gender in terrorism discourses.  In an attempt to answer this question, I 
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now turn to Luce Irigaray’s exploration of the relationship between language, gender, and the 
body. 
 
Body, Language, and Subjectivity 
 Authors such as Rajan, Cataldo Neuburger, and Gonzalez-Perez have explored in 
detail the ways in which patriarchal cultures shape readings of women’s violence “to support 
specific (often conservative) cultural ideologies about women” (Rajan 4).  In each case, these 
studies highlight how women’s testimonies about their terrorist actions are overwritten by 
political rhetoric, media representations, or terrorist propaganda.  Whilst understanding the 
patriarchal logic behind these appropriations is illuminating, it does not necessarily account 
for why women’s violence is prone to such manipulation, and why this need to co-opt 
women’s actions is so universal.  Indeed, patriarchy alone is not enough to explain why 
academic attempts like Jacques and Taylor’s study, that strive to negate conservative 
ideologies about women, are unable to dislodge them entirely from their epistemological 
framework. 
 Luce Irigaray’s work on the relationship between our bodies, language, and concepts 
of subjectivity can help build on these critiques of patriarchy.  Irigaray’s sustained critique of 
patriarchal traditions began when her linguistic research demonstrated that “[m]an and 
woman do not generate language and structure discourses in the same way” (Key Writings, 
35). Through her continued analysis of the linguistic habits of men and women and boys and 
girls across a variety of European languages, Irigaray has repeatedly shown that: 
[. . .]women seek to communicate, especially to hold dialogue, but they address above 
all to him or them-him, who do not take interest in subjective exchanges and who turn 
themselves rather towards the past than the present or the future; men, for their part, 
take interest in the concrete object if it is theirs (my car, my watch, my pipe, etc.) or in 
the abstract object if it is defined by men and belongs to a community of men to 
express their psychological states, their genealogical or familial problems; men avoid 
staying and talking as two, especially two who are different, and they would rather 
remain in a scarcely differentiated group of their own gender. (38, italics in original) 
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Women tend to speak in relational terms from their own position in the present and to address 
themselves to an other subject.  In other words, women always direct their discourse to 
someone other than themselves.  In contrast, rather than addressing themselves to an other, 
men take themselves as the speaking subject and relate themselves to objects or abstract ideas 
traditionally associated with masculinity.  Language, for women, is thus always reaching out 
to a listener, while for men, it is stating something about their place in the world.  
 Irigaray has conducted extensive analyses of Western philosophical, psychoanalytic, 
and scientific discourses based on this recognition that men and women situate themselves 
differently within in the same linguistic system and thus use different terms and phraseology 
to answer supposedly similar needs.   Her critiques of philosophy in particular unveil the 
extent to which a Western metaphysical tradition relies on the assumption that all subjects 
have the same access to language:  “A lack of attention about generation of language, of 
logos, permitted [philosophical authors] to consider as neutral and universal a truth and even 
a subjectivity in fact related to syntactic and more generally linguistic specific choices” (35).  
Throughout her oeuvre, Irigaray unmasks the ways in which difference is effaced in Western 
metaphysics and elaborates on the consequences of this assumption of a universal, neutral 
culture.  What Irigaray’s work exposes time and again is the fact that in a Western tradition 
women have no access to their own symbolic or to their own culture—whether it be in the 
complex relations between the symbolic, imaginary, and the real in psychoanalysis, or more 
general terms of the culture, subjectivity, and the body.  Western European cultures, 
languages, and metaphysics are rooted in the presumption that the neutral, universal subject is 
the masculine subject.  As such, our symbolic systems and cultural values follow a phallic 
morphology that places a premium on the vertical (hierarchy, the transcendental, the abstract, 
the disembodied) and on singularity (the individual, the unified, the discrete category, the 
masterful, rational subject), among other things.  It is vital to note that Irigaray does not argue 
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that this is man’s “natural” language; rather she insists that such a culture emerges when 
masculinity is mistakenly equated with the phallus, at the cost of cutting man off from the 
rest of his bodily existence.  Western patriarchy, for Irigaray, emerges as masculinity 
identifies itself solely with the phallus rather than understanding the masculine as coincident 
with the entire male body.  It is only through this radically reduced ideal of a phallic 
masculinity that men can proclaim to be the masters of a culture, as their identities seem to 
“naturally” coincide with values and ideals of a phallically-constituted patriarchal society. 
 However, while masculinity is reduced to the purely phallic by symbolics and cultures 
based on this morphology, the feminine and women are left in what Irigaray describes as a 
state of “dereliction”—a state Whitford explains “connotes for example the state of being 
abandoned by God [ . . .] left without hope, without help, without refuge. Women are 
abandoned outside the symbolic order; they lack mediation in the symbolic for the operations 
of sublimation” (77–78).  In essence, dereliction describes the situation women are left in by 
a culture that takes the phallic subject as the ideal. In order to maintain the fantasy of a 
singular, unified subject, a phallic economy must disavow the fact that are at least two sexes, 
at least two bodies, two morphologies that can shape a culture and a symbolic system.  Thus, 
phallic logic constantly works to disavow the presence of sexuate difference (sexuate being 
neither a simply biological nor sociological sexual identity, but inextricably both).  It does so 
by claiming to describe the feminine, women, in its own terms, and by reducing the feminine 
to the non-masculine, leading to our stereotypes of femininity as natural, earthly, passive, 
bodily and emotional—always the binary opposite of a masculine standard or norm. In a 
phallic economy, then, women and femininity are always understood in terms of otherness, 
through concepts, phrases and representations that do not come from women themselves.  
More than this, because Western culture is constituted by a phallic morphology, women and 
the feminine are left without terms appropriate to themselves and must instead try to express 
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themselves in a language and symbolic system that does not recognise their own bodily 
existence.  Left to speak with a phallically-inflected tongue, a woman can, thus, never truly 
express her intention or meaning, and thus is effectively silenced, deprived of agency before 
she has even uttered a word.  
 Without a culture of her own, without a symbolic that arises from her own bodily 
existence, woman and the feminine remain in a state of immanence and are reduced to a 
solely bodily existence in a Western phallic economy.  This immanence serves to sustain the 
phallic economy as the allocation of materiality to the feminine allows the phallic masculine 
to claim the transcendental for itself.  Thus, women are valued for their ability to be mothers, 
to reproduce masculine subjects—but that is all.  As the material grounding of the phallic 
economy that both supports and perpetuates it, it is essential that women remain as the other 
of the phallic masculine—for if the feminine were allowed to express itself or were accorded 
an agency of her own, the economy would collapse.  Irigaray writes:  
Subjectivity denied to woman: indisputably this provides the financial backing for 
every irreducible constitution as an object: of representation, of discourse, of desire.  
Once imagine that woman imagines and the object loses its fixed, obsessional 
character.  As a bench mark that is ultimately more crucial than the subject, for he can 
sustain himself only by bouncing back off some objectiveness, some objective.  If 
there is no more “earth” to press down/repress, to work, to represent, but also and 
always desire (for one’s own), no opaque matter which in theory does not know 
herself, then what pedestal remains for the ex-sistence of the “subject”?  If the earth 
turned and more especially turned upon herself, the erection of the subject might 
thereby be disconcerted and risk losing its elevation and penetration.  For what would 
there by to rise up from and exercise his power over?  And in? (Speculum 133). 
To imagine that women are subjects, too—different subjects rather than simply the “other” of 
men—is to pose a challenge to the very foundations of a phallically constituted economy.  
Women’s agency and feminine subjectivity must be disavowed in all their forms—whether 
this means closing down the possibility of feminine symbolics or appropriating the maternal 
role to one of “reproducing” the subject.  What, then, happens when the material 
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consequences of a woman’s actions put her agency beyond doubt?  How do Western phallic 
cultures absorb the impact of women’s suicide bombing? 
 
 
The Disavowal of Women’s Agency and Feminine Specificity 
Placed in this context, Jacques’ and Taylor’s conclusions about the different 
motivations behind male and female suicide bombings are both predictable and illustrative of 
the widespread characterization of women’s violence in Western discourses.  After collating 
the first-, second-, and third-hand accounts of male and female suicide bombings and passing 
these texts through a log-linear analysis, the authors find that “males were found to be more 
often motivated by religious/nationalistic factors compared to females, whereas females cited 
more revenge motivations and more personal reasons than men” (321).  Jacques’ and 
Taylor’s findings are not surprising given the innate association of the personal with the 
feminine in their epistemological approach.  Furthermore, their findings are in keeping with 
Irigaray’s analysis of how the sexes use language differently—women adopting more 
relational terms and men locating themselves within the wider world.  
However, it is in how these notions of the personal and the religious/nationalistic 
inflect the final interpretation of suicide bombings that we see how the problem represented 
by the woman bomber’s agency is negotiated.  Importing terminology from other studies of 
suicide terrorism, Jacques and Taylor conclude that religious and nationalistic motives lead to 
“altruistic” actions, while the suicide bomber motivated by personal reasons is “fatalistic” 
(321). In other words, while the male suicide bomber is read as making a political or 
ideological stand for the group to which he is attached, the female suicide bomber is read as 
engaging in suicide bombing because her personal life has made her suicidal, as is the case 
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with non-terrorist suicide.  This contrast in representation becomes particularly interesting in 
light of Rajan’s analysis that men do frequently connect their involvement in suicide 
terrorism to “personal” motivations.  Thus, Rajan’s study challenges attempts to make a 
distinction between the “personal” and the ideological or political by making clear that the 
political, ideological, and cultural contexts in which all those who turn to suicide terrorism 
live necessarily impacts on their personal lives (Rajan, see in particular chapter 1). Therefore, 
when the Western epistemology of terrorism describes the woman terrorist as motivated by 
the “personal,” it does so specifically in order to disavow the possibility of feminine agency. 
Nowhere is this more apparent than in the figure of the woman suicide bomber who “slips 
ideas of the bomb with that of the body, rendering it a weapon of war” (Rajan 16).  At the 
moment in which a woman becomes pure bodily action, terrorism discourses undermine her 
agency by describing it as a pathological self-destruction, not as an attempt to intervene in the 
wider narratives that shape her social sphere.  Even the most extreme manifestation of 
women’s violence is not seen as an attack, effectively rendering the “woman terrorist” an 
impossible figure. 
Woman, as the exceptional subject and as the non-masculine in a phallic economy, 
will always be read through her body in Western representations.  Her actions are always 
related to her gender, and this connection to her body means that her motivations will 
inevitably be understood as “personal.”  The failure to recognise that the sexes locate 
themselves within linguistic representations differently means that women’s own testimonies 
lead them to be read as deviating from a masculine norm; consequently, their actions are 
automatically imbued with pathological overtones.  Psychological factors are discussed 
throughout terrorism studies that take men as the “normal” terrorist, but are rarely considered 
in isolation, as the mind-set of the terrorist is placed in the wider context of political, 
economic, social, and educational influences.  Poverty, disenfranchisement, and a sense that 
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one’s identity and status have been maligned are seen as factors leading the normal, gender-
neutral terrorist to lash out against this assault on their sense of self by turning to the 
“compelling collective identities” offered by terrorist organisations (Jacques and Taylor 306). 
Yet although it is an attack on one’s identity and status that leads one to turn to terrorist 
organisations, somehow these motivations are never read as “personal.”   If, as Irigaray 
suggests, men more readily relate themselves to the abstract concepts that permeate a phallic 
economy, is it any surprise that their testimonies locate their actions in a wider cultural 
context in a way that bestows greater value and agency their motivations?  An epistemology 
that takes the masculine as its yardstick does not hear women in their own terms but instead 
understands their accounts in relation to another’s discourse.  As such, women’s language is 
interpreted as being “personal” and so is disconnected from the broader contextual factors 
affecting their lives.  The result of this personalisation is damaging: woman’s violence is 
inherently associated with her psychological make-up, and, hence, her resort to violence 
carries with it pathological overtones.  
 The cultural desire to reduce women to their bodily presence and assess their value 
through their bodies within Western systems of representation reinforces this sense of 
pathology. Understanding women through their bodies means they are persistently located 
within the immediate contexts they inhabit.  Unlike the gender-neutral terrorist—the 
masculine terrorist   whose gender goes unremarked until women enter terrorism 
discourses—the factors that motivate a woman to resort to terrorism must arise from her 
experiences within the domestic sphere.  The death of a loved one, a sexual assault, family 
dishonour, or the persuasive words of a militant man she loves obsessively are all often cited 
by studies as fully explaining her turn to violence.  Despite Jacques and Taylor’s recognition 
that men and women living under the same conditions will suffer loss and become aggressive 
in a similar fashion, it is only woman’s violence that is persistently located in the domestic, 
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rather than in the nationalistic or global, context.  There is rarely, if ever, any recognition that 
the death of child is connected to the suffering of a community at large, or that a woman’s 
own sense of disenfranchisement from national or international economic, social, or political 
spheres could be a potential motive.  Her violence comes from the domestic, familial sphere, 
or by coerced indoctrination from the men around her into “big ideas” she would not 
otherwise understand or even be conscious of.  
In essence, the Western epistemology of terrorism locates the possibility of female 
violence firmly in a woman’s immediate surroundings, never in the abstract.  Similarly, her 
violence is always rooted in pain caused by a traumatic experience in her immediate sphere, 
and thus becomes a consequence of her vulnerability to her own emotional states.  She is 
never quite the rational master of her own work and thus is deprived of any agency.  Most 
troubling of all, as so few women living in the same conditions resort to violence, the woman 
terrorist or suicide bomber is represented as an even greater aberration because she alone, 
unlike other women in comparable circumstances, is unable to tolerate the conditions she is 
living under.  The epistemology of terrorism suggests she alone deviates from an infinitely 
tolerant feminine norm in her turn to violence.  
 It is arguably this perception of transgression that circulates beneath the fascination 
with women and terrorism in Western political, media and academic discourses.  It is 
accepted that a specific set of circumstances and strains will lead a man to deploy his agency 
violently—and that this action is logical and consciously undertaken.  Yet when women 
choose to do the same under the same conjunction of motivating factors, her engagement is 
read as both exceptional and deviant: for a woman to eschew the natural tolerance and 
passivity of femininity, something out of the ordinary must have happened to her personally.  
This universal rendering of the feminine manifests itself in the peculiar way in which cultural 
specificity is overwritten when discussing women’s motivations. Despite the fact that women 
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are always located within their domestic surroundings, these surroundings become almost a-
cultural in relation to women’s violence.  Whilst men’s actions are contextualised by 
discourses around nationalism, religion, global politics, etc., the application of the 
epistemology of the personal means that women’s contexts are disconnected from these wider 
discourses.  Thus, women are rarely cultural agents, located in specific socio-cultural 
contexts, but are instead representatives of patriarchal notions of a universal feminine.  
Indeed, Jacques and Taylor state explicitly that their attempt to explain female 
terrorism necessitates ignoring cultural specificity, as they exclude consideration of work that 
“suggests that suicide terrorists from differing groups may hold dissimilar motivations” in 
order to provide “an initial investigation of the pervasive differences between females and 
males”(311).  Thus, their study follows the conventional wisdom of most terrorism 
discourses.  In removing the context in which women have resorted to violence—such an 
epistemological approach—perpetuates the West’s stereotype that women are apolitical 
wives and mothers who should remain entirely within the domestic sphere.  In other words, 
women are denied any capacity to act within the abstract realms of the ideological, religious, 
political, and cultural.  In the epistemology of terrorism, women across the globe are read as 
being outside of the systems in conflict.  The female terrorist is the other of the terrorist 
Other, and as such, she can have no agency of her own, not even the deviant agency accorded 
to the gender-neutral figure of the terrorist. 
 
Implications 
 The disavowal of sexuate difference in Western culture leads to an overwriting of 
women’s cultural specificity in its epistemological frameworks.  This, in effect, denies 
women any agency, even when women have taken up arms in conflict.  While I have 
necessarily focused on the representations of women’s violence in research arising from 
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Western sources, Rajan demonstrates that similar processes take place on all sides of a 
conflict: 
Western nations tend to depict women bombers through common stereotypes of Third 
World women who are assumed to be victimized by Third World men and backward 
Third World cultures [. . .].  In contrast, rebel nationalists produce images of women 
bombers to resonate with iconic cultural registers of femininity central to various anti-
colonial nationalist movements in the colonial era, of women who sacrificed for and 
were loyal only to their cultures (3). 
 
Viewed as victims or idealised by propaganda, women’s voices are silenced by the images of 
them produced by competing forces.  Rajan’s observations echo what Spivak describes as the 
“dialectically interlocking sentences” around sati in the British India, where colonizing and 
colonized men spoke for native women: “White men are saving brown women from brown 
men,” and “The women wanted to die” ("Subaltern” 93).  Once again, women find 
themselves placed in a subaltern position, denied of any stake in the discourses surrounding 
them by patriarchal discourses. 
 I cannot speak for the women who have become suicide bombers or turned to terrorist 
violence.  However, I can attempt to draw attention to the consequences this sustained 
disavowal of women’s violent agency can have on the West’s understanding of the possibility 
of women having any form of legitimate agency.  Returning again to Spivak’s observation 
about the symbiotic nature of response, we have to ask what impact these constructions have 
on the culture that produces them?  If the West’s response to women’s terrorism is to 
represent them as lacking agency, even as they become pure physical effect, what kind of 
norms does this reinstall in the West?  
These norms begin to manifest themselves as terrorism discourses co-opt seemingly 
feminist rhetoric.  Increasingly, the roles assigned to women by various terrorist groups have 
become a means of vilifying the group.  Organisations that consider women as “equals” 
within the movement are criticised, Ness observes, for “not [being] entirely able to divest 
themselves of the widely held beliefs about gender embedded in the culture surrounding 
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them” (“In the Name” 355), whilst groups that exclude women because, as Michael Burleigh 
writes, they “belong in the crib and kitchen” (393) are scorned for their sexism.  These 
accusations have been lobbied at Marxist, anarchist, nationalist, and other politically-
motivated terrorist groups over the decades, but most recently, accusations of sexism and the 
willingness to abuse women have been used in Western terrorism discourses to discredit 
conservative Islamic groups who bring women into their ranks (Cook).  Just as the Bush 
administration cloaked its invasion of Afghanistan in the rhetoric of women’s rights, so 
terrorism studies use a reductive concept of feminism to pillory terrorist organizations for 
failing to provide “equal opportunities.” In doing so, these studies aim to discredit the group 
by holding them to higher standards of gender equality than are present in the societies 
around them, in a manner that positions the West as the progressive standard bearer of such 
equality. In essence, within terrorism discourses, feminism-as-equal-rights no longer 
concerns women’s agency, but becomes a means of identifying enlightened masculinity and 
deviant masculinity, with the terrorist exposed as the perpetual misogynist.  
When conflated with this appropriation and reduction of feminism, the representation 
of the personally motivated woman terrorist collapses the possibility of women’s agency in a 
system that only recognises the purely political or ideological as a legitimate form of social 
intervention or motivation.  Discrediting a terrorist group because of its gender politics 
undermines women’s agency once again. The men in such readings become misogynist, 
hypocritical, or exploitative.  Women—always read as acting in relation to their gender 
whether their goals are explicitly feminist or not—can only be seen as the poor dupes of a 
masculine machine.  Their attempts to act, to participate in something beyond the domestic 
sphere, leave them vulnerable to exploitation.  Or if they are read as following an equal rights 
agenda, feminist thinking has either led them into danger or to become dangerous, as their 
demand for equality becomes a demand for violent action.  In either case, such rhetoric 
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suggests that feminist ideals and fantasies of equality lead vulnerable women into the hands 
of men who would exploit them, or encourages women with “unnatural” predispositions to 
violent behaviour to actually harm others.  
The possibility that feminisms could provide ideological, political, and revolutionary 
motivations is rarely recognised in terrorism studies, even as research such as Gonzalez-
Perez’s suggests women are more likely to be involved in militant action that will bring about 
a direct change in their status as citizens (7).  Thus, the epistemology of terrorism not only 
reduces feminism to a personal, rather than a political, agenda, but it inflects feminism with 
pathological overtones to represent it as an ethos that leaves women vulnerable or 
dangerously aggressive. 
 It is in this articulation of feminism that we see that the Western epistemological 
approach to terrorism has consequences for both the women under scrutiny and the women 
who belong to the cultures producing the framework.  As Brigitte Nacos eloquently 
illustrates, women’s political agency in the West already suffers from being translated in 
terms that parallel that of women terrorists (Nacos).  For feminist approaches to become 
associated with the pathological and the purely personal would see the shutting down of the 
very discourses that women use to locate and articulate what little agency they can.  Given 
the growing significance terrorism discourses have in shaping counter-terrorist strategy on 
the national and international stage there is a very real risk that such reductive misreadings of 
feminisms will be, albeit unconsciously, installed at the highest legislative levels.  The 
disavowal of women’s violent agency within terrorism discourses potentially impacts on all 
aspects of all women’s agency. 
Whilst we have long realised that legal and cultural frameworks in even the most 
“liberated” countries take the masculine as the normative human subject, to date such 
frameworks remain idiosyncratic, regional, and contextual.  However, it is within emerging 
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global discourses, like those around terrorism which seemingly have nothing to do with 
gender and sexuate identities, that understandings of normative identities are being exported, 
absorbed, and encoded at a global level. This quiet installation of a global norm has the 
potential to be incredibly tenacious, as it remains largely beneath the level of explicit 
articulation and produces a hegemonic epistemological and ontological reading of women 
and femininity that is harder to counter than the explicit anomalies thrown up by regional or 
culturally-specific genderings.  In the face of such a global hegemony, it becomes imperative 
that we critique the mechanisms that figure our understandings of the world. By drawing on 
the work of Spivak and Irigaray, I hope to have demonstrated that the two together offer us 
the means to do this. It is only when the West recognises the possibility of “at least two” 
subjects by cultivating sexuate difference that we can truly interrupt our constructions in 
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